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Abstract 
Hinterecker et al. (2016) compared the adequacy of the probabilistic new paradigm in reasoning with the 
recent revision of mental models theory (MMT) for explaining a novel class of inferences containing the 
modal term “possibly”. For example, the door is closed or the window is open or both, therefore, possibly 
the door is closed and the window is open (A or B or both, therefore, possibly(A & B)). They concluded 
that their results support MMT. In this comment, it is argued that Hinterecker et al. (2016) have not 
adequately characterised the theory of probabilistic validity (p-validity) on which the new paradigm 
depends.  It is unclear how p-validity can be applied to these inferences, which are anyway peripheral to 
the theory. It is also argued that the revision of MMT is not well motivated and its adoption leads to many 
logical absurdities.  Moreover, the comparison is not appropriate because these theories are defined at 
different levels of computational explanation. In particular, revised MMT lacks a provably consistent 
computational level theory that could justify treating these inferences as valid. It is further argued that the 
data could result from the non-colloquial locutions used to express the premises. Finally, an alternative 
pragmatic account is proposed based on the idea that a conclusion is possible if what someone knows 
cannot rule it out. This account could be applied to the unrevised mental model theory rendering the 
revision redundant. 
Keywords:  New paradigm, mental models, modal inference, probability logic, epistemic modals, 
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Paradigms, Possibilities, and Probabilities: Comment on  
Hinterecker et al. (2016) 
Over the last 25 years, a new paradigm has emerged in the psychology of reasoning that has 
adopted probability theory as a normative standard against which to compare human reasoning 
performance (Elqayam & Over, 2013; Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Douven 
& Verbrugge, 2010; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Hattori, 2016; Oberauer & Wilhelm, 
2003; Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2007, 2009; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000; Over, Hadjichristidis, 
Evans, Sloman, & Handley, 2007). This new paradigm is part of the general Bayesian turn in the 
cognitive and brain sciences (e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006; Clark, 
2013; Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2008; Friston, 2005; Friston, Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Moutoussis, 
Behrens, & Dolan, 2013; Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 
2008; Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2007; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), which began 
with Anderson’s rational analysis approach (Anderson, 1990, 1991). Bayesian rational analyses of 
reasoning were developed quite early on in the progress of Bayesian cognitive science (Oaksford & 
Chater, 1994, 1996). The psychology of reasoning studies the inferences that people draw using the 
logical terms of natural language, examples being and, or, not, if…then, all, and some. The core of the 
Bayesian new paradigm is to study reasoning from uncertain premises, and to treat even reasoning on 
logical tasks as probabilistic rather than binary (Adams, 1998; Bennett, 2003; Edgington, 1995). This 
proposal requires that we assess inferences for probabilistic validity, p-validity, rather than classical 
binary validity. Against the standard of p-validity more of people’s reasoning appears rational rather than 
subject to systematic bias. 
A new paradigm presupposes an older paradigm that it has pretensions to replace. This older 
paradigm in the psychology of reasoning was based on binary truth-functional logic, where propositions 
of any complexity can be assigned a binary truth value, true or false. The most widely applied account of 
this type was mental models theory (MMT, Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002). On this account, people 
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represent the possibilities in which a complex sentence is true. These complete, or “fully explicit”, 
representations (see (FE) below) licensed as “valid” all and only the inferences sanctioned by classical 
binary logic. Mental models are cut down versions of these fully explicit models that eliminate the 
negated terms (see (MM) below) and then typically reduce to a single preferred possibility (Hinterecker, 
Knauff, & Johnson-Laird, 2016, p. 3). These mental models can account for some of the systematic errors 
seen in peoples’ reasoning. This theory has recently been fundamentally revised and extended to account 
for ordinary people’s reasoning with the modal term “possibly” (Hinterecker et al., 2016; Johnson-Laird, 
Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015; Khemlani, Hinterecker, & Johnson-Laird, 2017). Hinterecker et al. (2016) 
compared the adequacy of this revised MMT with p-validity for explaining a novel class of inferences 
containing “possibly” (◊).1  For example, the door is closed or the window is open or both, therefore, 
possibly the door is closed and the window is open (A or B or both, therefore, ◊(A & B)). They concluded 
that their results support MMT and not p-validity. 
In this paper, we argue that before drawing such a conclusion the following questions need to be 
addressed. First, have Hinterecker et al. (2016) adequately characterised the competitor theory?  In 
particular, can p-validity be directly applied to these inferences, and do these results challenge the core of 
p-validity, or are they a peripheral issue? Second, is the revision of MMT that allows these predictions 
well motivated? Third, is the comparison between theories appropriate given the computational level at 
which each theory is framed? Fourth, in their own terms, how successfully do these results discount the 
probabilistic approach? Finally, is there a better account of their results? 
 
Probabilistic Validity 
Have Hinterecker et al. (2016) adequately characterised the competitor theory?  The core of the 
new paradigm probabilistic approach to human reasoning is the Equation (Adams, 1998; Bennett, 2003; 
                                                 
 
1 Because the term “possibly” will recur many times in this paper, from here on we use the traditional 
logical symbol ◊ for this term. 
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Edgington, 1995). The Equation states that the probability of a natural language indicative conditional, if 
you turn the key, then the car starts, is the conditional probability of the car starting given you turn the 
key, Pr(if A then B) = Pr(B|A). A conditional that satisfies the Equation is a probability conditional 
(Adams, 1998), and it stands in contrast to the material conditional of classical binary logic, A ⊃ B, which 
is true if and only if its antecedent is false (¬A, using ¬ for “not”) or its consequent (B) is true. Our 
example would then be true if and only if you do not turn the key or the car starts. Consequently, the 
probability of the material conditional, Pr(A ⊃ B), is the probability that the antecedent is false or the 
consequent is true, that is, Pr(A ⊃ B) = Pr(¬A or B). 
According to the Equation, a probability conditional is not truth-functional, and its valid 
inferences are not identical with the valid inferences for the material conditional. For a logically valid 
inference in binary logic, if the premises are true the conclusion must be true. The probability conditional 
is inexpressible in binary logic, and so inferences containing it cannot be assessed there for validity, but 
they can be evaluated for probabilistic validity, p-validity (Adams, 1998). A single premise argument is p-
valid if and only if the probability of its premise cannot be coherently (consistent with probability theory) 
greater than the probability of its conclusion: Pr(premise) ≤ Pr(conclusion). For example, take the 
logically valid inference: supposing a car is black and a Citroen, it is black (and-elimination). This 
inference is also p-valid because the probability of a car being black and a Citroen must be less than (or 
equal to) the smaller of the probability of being black or the probability of being a Citroen: Pr(black & 
Citroen) ≤ min{Pr(black), Pr(Citroen)}. To violate this constraint would be to commit the conjunction 
fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Consequently, and-elimination is both classically and 
probabilistically valid.  
However, some inferences that are classically valid for the material conditional are not p-valid for 
the probability conditional (Adams, 1998; Baratgin, Douven, Evans, Oaksford, Over, & Politzer, 2015; 
Bennett, 2003; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). For an important example, strengthening the antecedent, if A 
then B, therefore if (A & C) then B, is not p-valid for the probability conditional (though it is for the 
material conditional) because Pr(B|A) > Pr(B|A & C) in some cases. It is perfectly coherent to make the 
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following probability assignments, Pr(the car starts | you turn the key) = .9 and Pr(the car starts | you turn 
the key & the fuel tank in empty) = 0. But this means that Pr(the car starts | you turn the key) > Pr(the car 
starts | you turn the key & the fuel tank is empty), proving that strengthening the antecedent is not p-valid 
for the probability conditional. It is because of the p-invalidity of strengthening the antecedent that the 
probability conditional is non-monotonic: adding information to its antecedent can cause its probability to 
fall from a high level to zero.2  
It must be stressed that p-validity is itself monotonic, since adding premises to a p-valid inference 
cannot make it p-invalid (Baratgin et al., 2015). Transparently for single-premise p-valid inferences, if 
Pr(premise 1) ≤ Pr(conclusion), then Pr(premise 1 & premise 2) ≤ Pr(conclusion), on pain of committing 
the conjunction fallacy. There is no mystery here.  Mathematical probability theory establishes the non-
monotonicity of the probability conditional, and the axiomatic system for p-validity, which is sometimes 
called System P (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009), is provably sound (more general than consistent), complete, 
and decidable (Adams, 1998). The probability conditional is at the centre of the logic that is System P, 
and it is non-monotonic in the sense we have just explained, but p-validity is at the centre of the metalogic 
of System P, and it is monotonic.  
The distinction between a logic and its metalogic is critical to analysing logical systems. The 
metalogic provides the account of how the whole system behaves which depends on the logical language 
(or object language) and the consequence relation. In System P, the probability conditional is part of the 
object language, and we describe its properties at the meta-level via the system’s consequence relation 
(⊢𝑝). So we could express the fact that strengthening the antecedent is not p-valid in System P, as if A 
then B ⊬𝑝  if A & C, then B. Strengthening does not hold for a probability conditional if A then B, making 
                                                 
 
2 There is a further sense in which non-monotonicity can arise when interpreting the conditional as in the 
Equation. This is when new information suggests that the conditional probabilities themselves have changed. This is 
called dynamic inference (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2013)  
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it non-monotonic, but the consequence relation, ⊢𝑝, of System P is monotonic, just like the consequence 
relation for classical logic, ⊢.  
 
Problems for Hinterecker et al.’s Exposition 
There are a variety of problems created by Hinterecker et al.’s discussion of the probabilistic 
approach. 
Non-Monotonicity. We have been careful introducing p-validity because Hinterecker et al. 
(2016, p. 1608) have not been. They argue that “…p-logic is monotonic (Chater & Oaksford, 2009; Over, 
2009) contrary to Adams’s avowed purpose in developing it (Adams, 1998, p. 3), though it has inspired 
nonmonotonic systems of reasoning…” We are not sure how Hinterecker et al. (2016) use the term “p-
logic”. But if it is used to describe any logic that includes a probability conditional, then p-logic is non-
monotonic, contrary to Hinterecker et al. (2016). Hinterecker et al. seem to be confounding, the logic of 
the probability conditional, System P, with its metalogic, where p-validity is defined, again as we have 
just explained. Using “p-logic” for both the logic and metalogic of System P will only cause confusion in 
the psychology of reasoning. 
Core and Periphery. Having a fuller understanding of the new paradigm probabilistic approach 
shows that Hintercker et al. (2016) are only criticising it at the periphery, where, in general, it agrees with 
standard logic. They do not focus their criticisms on the core, i.e., the probability conditional. 
Nonetheless, their results are potentially interesting because of the attempt to relate modal notions like 
possibility and necessity to probabilities.  
Probabilities of Possibilities. To apply the normative concept of p-validity to inferences like A 
or B or both, therefore, ◊(A & B), requires a normative understanding of how we should assign 
probabilities to possibilities. Can we establish normatively, for p-validity, that Pr(◊(A & B)) cannot be 
strictly less than Pr(A or B or both)? For non-modal premises and conclusions, we can do this 
deductively. It is possible to infer deductively a coherence interval for the probability of the conclusion 
given the premises. For example, for the and-elimination inference, Citroen and black, therefore, black, 
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the probability of the conclusion, Pr(black), must be in the inclusive interval between Pr(Citroen and 
black) and 1 (Pr(A) ∈ [Pr(A & B), 1]). These coherence intervals follow from the axioms of probability 
theory as a matter of deductive logic. Once inferred, we can show whether the lower bound is greater than 
or equal to the probability of the premises (Gilio & Over, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2017; Pfeifer & 
Kleiter, 2009; Politzer, 2016). However, as Hinterecker et al. (2016, p. 1607) observe, there is no modal 
logic (Garson, 2016) in which the inference from A or B or both to ◊(A & B) is valid. Consequently, the 
constraints the premise imposes on the coherence interval for the conclusion are unknown. 
There would appear to be two possibilities for how we should interpret Pr(◊(A & B)). First, the 
standard view is that probability is a refinement of the modality of possibility. If X is impossible, Pr(X) = 
0, if X is necessary Pr(X) = 1, and if X is possible, Pr(X) > 0. Hinterecker et al. do not consider this 
possibility, in which Pr(◊(A & B)) is a type of iterated modality (a relevant reference is Demey, Kooi, & 
Sack, 2017, on modal probability logic). Second, participants could interpret the question as, “what is the 
probability that a contingent proposition is possible?”, and not, “what is the probability of a possibility?” 
A contingent statement X is always logically possible, even if ¬X is true in fact. All it means to say that X 
is logically possible is that X is not logically inconsistent. Thus for contingent statements, Pr(◊X), and the 
special case of Pr(◊(A & B)), should be assigned a probability of 1 for logical possibility. Hinterecker et 
al. are unclear about this point, but they are apparently not referring to the extremely weak notion of 
logical (or alethic) possibility as the fundamental modality in their system. Khemlani et al. (2017) state, 
“The present paper focuses on a different notion of possibility: ‘epistemic’ possibilities concern 
possibilities that are consistent with a reasoner’s personal knowledge.” 
Even so, Hinterecker et al. (2016, p. 1611) do countenance the possibility that Pr(◊(A & B)) could 
be assigned a probability of 1. They note that ◊(A & B) holds “… in any of the contingencies in the JPD, 
and so its probability could be as high as 100%.” But if this is the correct normative position, then 
Hinterecker et al. are incorrect in central statements that they make about the p-validity of the modal 
inferences they study. Hinterecker et al. (2016, p. 1611) claim, for example, that it is not p-valid to infer 
◊(A & B) from A or B but not both. This inference, however, would be p-valid in their materials for 
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judgments about logical possibility. The reason is that Pr(◊(A & B)) would always be 1 for their jointly 
contingent materials. Consequently, Pr(A or B but not both) ≤ Pr(◊(A & B)) = 1, making the inference p-
valid and not p-invalid. In summary, without a normative theory of how people should interpret Pr(◊(A & 
B)) in their materials, Hinterecker et al. have no account of when inferences using epistemic possibilities 
are p-valid or not. 
Empirical Probabilities. The problem we have just identified perhaps motivated Hinterecker et 
al. to also ask participants for empirical estimates of the probabilities Pr(premise) and Pr(conclusion). 
Ostensibly this was to check whether people regard these inferences as p-valid or not. But all we could 
learn from these data, if we had a normative theory of p-validity for these inferences, is whether these 
probability assignments were coherent or not. Without this normative theory, these empirical probabilities 
are just studies of people’s intuitive probability estimates in the absence of a theory of whether they are 
right or wrong.  
A question that we can address is, if participants’ estimates are such that Pr(premise) ≤ 
Pr(conclusion), do they accept the inference and reject it otherwise? That is, regardless of the actual p-
validity of the inference, do participants show some sensitivity to the impact of judging that Pr(premise) ≤ 
Pr(conclusion) on whether they say the conclusion follows from the premises? Hinterecker et al. (2016, p 
1618) say, “The participants’ estimates of the probabilities of the premises and conclusions did not 
determine their acceptance or rejection of inferences.” While this was true of the limited set of four 
inferences investigated in Experiments 1 and 2, when broadened out to twelve further inferences in 
Experiment 3, “p-valid inferences were accepted reliably more often than p-invalid inferences” 
(Hinterecker et al., 2016, p 1616). Inspection of their Table 8 also suggests that inferences judged p-
invalid were rejected reliably more often than inferences judged p-valid. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
result held primarily for the non-modal inferences from the premise A & B. In summary, despite 
Hinterecker et al.’s claims to the contrary, by their own admission, they detected significant sensitivity to 
the import of judging whether Pr(premise) ≤ Pr(conclusion) for the acceptability of inferences. 
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Summary. Hinterecker et al. conflate the non-monotonic probability conditional in System P 
with the monotonic meta-logical concept of p-validity. They compare MMT with p-validity only at the 
periphery, not for the core probability conditional. They provide no normative account of the p-validity of 
the modal inferences they study, so these data cannot address whether people conform to p-validity or not. 
However, contra Hinterecker et al., participants do seem sensitive to the import of judging that 
Pr(premise) ≤ Pr(conclusion) for some inferences. 
One might argue that the lack of a normative account of p-validity for these inferences is all the 
worse for the new probabilistic paradigm. However, this can only count in favour of the alternative MMT 
account if the recent revision that makes predictions for these modal inferences is well motivated.  
 
Revised Mental Models Theory 
The original version of MMT was tied to binary extensional logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991, 2002).  The theory represented the fully explicit meaning of a compound sentence, for example, A 
or B or both, by what was equivalent to its logical disjunctive normal form (DNF): (A & ¬B) or (¬A & B) 
or (A & B). Each disjunct (connected by or) is the conjunction (&) of literals (variables or their negations) 
that make the compound sentence true, and these conjunctions, therefore, correspond to the lines of a 
truth table in which the compound sentence is true. The fully explicit model represents each disjunct in a 
row and removes the conjunctions as in: 
 
 (FE) 
               A    ¬B 
             ¬A      B 
               A       B 
Mental models do not represent the negated cases as in: 
 
 (MM) 
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             A        
                     B 
            A       B 
This version of MMT accepted classical validity: if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be 
true. 
This earlier version of MMT faced a serious problem. It accepted all the valid inferences for the 
material conditional (A  B) as also “valid” for the natural language conditional if A then B. Consequently 
if A then B supposedly followed “validly” from not-A and B as separate premises. Logicians refer to these 
inferences as “the paradoxes of the material conditional (material implication)”. They are paradoxical 
because, for example, they entail that if you become a chain smoker, then your health will improve 
follows validly from you will not become a chain smoker. These inferences are not p-valid for the 
probability conditional (Adams, 1998), which therefore strongly challenged the MMT account of the 
natural language conditional (Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). 
In the new, revised version of mental models theory, a compound sentence like a disjunction is 
held to be true, not when one of the disjuncts in its DNF holds, but only “…provided that each of these 
three cases is possible” (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, p. 204). Thus the representation of A or B becomes 
equivalent to a conjunction of possibilities (COP), which can be written (see, Khemlani et al., 2017) in the 
following way: ◊(A & ¬B) & ◊(¬A & B) & ◊(A & B). This representation is the default, because 
“modulation” can “block” a conjunction that is impossible (Hinterecker et al., 2016). Hinterecker et al. 
(2016) write the possibilities in a COP in a list in the just same way as in the old version of mental models 
omitting negated variables (see (MM)). Doing so masks the radical change from a DNF to a COP. This 
change renders “invalid” some inferences formerly regarded as valid in the old version of the theory. In 
particular, agreeing with p-validity, the paradoxes of the material conditional are no longer considered 
valid. This revision also allows MMT to make predictions about people’s modal inferences from 
disjunctions and other compound sentences (Hinterecker et al., 2016; Khemlani et al., 2017). Given the 
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change to interpreting (FE) as a COP, inferences like A or B or both, therefore, ◊(A & B) follow by 
definition. 
 
Problems with the Revised MMT 
This radical revision of MMT faces immediate problems, some of which we have raised already 
(Baratgin et al., 2015).  
Baratgin et al. (2015). Baratgin et al. (2015) observed that the new interpretation of A or B in 
terms of COPs immediately lead to range of logical absurdities, some of which we list here (see also 
Cruz, Over, & Oaksford, 2017). 
1. A or B and it is possible that A or B must share the same mental representation, but surely the 
latter is weaker than the former. 
2. Where A and B are jointly contingent, just about every ordinary disjunction must be true for 
logical possibility (and for what Khemlani et al., 2017, seem to mean by “epistemic possibility”).  
3. An exception is the classical tautology A or ¬A, which is false because A & ¬A is not possible, 
not logically and not epistemically.   
4. The fundamental inference of or-introduction (A, therefore, A or B), which is p-valid, is rendered 
invalid because “The premise [A] does not establish that the second [¬A & B in (FE)] and third [A 
& B in (FE)] cases are possible” (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, p. 205). But again these cases are 
always logically possible for jointly contingent A and B.  
5. If or-introduction is invalid, then A and ¬(A or B) are consistent. However, ¬(A or B) is 
equivalent to ¬A & ¬B, and it is absurd to say that this is consistent with A. It does not have a 
model in common with A, and MMT itself defines consistency as having at least one mental 
model in common. 
6. People can never commit the disjunction fallacy of judging that Pr(A) > Pr(A or B) (Bar-Hillel & 
Neter, 1993). Responding that Pr(A) > Pr(A or B) is not a fallacy if it is invalid to infer A or B 
from A. 
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These cases illustrate that the revised MMT creates a range of logical absurdities. As we now 
show, they do not exhaust the problems for the revised MMT. 
Or-Introduction is judged p-valid. People generally respect the p-validity of inferring A or B 
from A by responding that Pr(A) ≤ Pr(A or B) (Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & Over, 2015; Cruz et al., 
2017). Johnson-Laird et al. (2015) cite evidence that people “baulk” at accepting this inference (Orenes & 
Johnson-Laird, 2012). But in this paper, a pragmatic explanation for this effect is provided because it was 
written before MMT was revised when or-introduction was still considered valid. Their earlier account 
seems more consistent with the evidence than the revised MMT (Cruz et al., 2017). 
Inclusive and exclusive or. An important discriminatory prediction for Hinterecker et al. (2016, 
p. 1611, Table 1) is that A or B but not both, therefore, A or B or both is not valid in the revised MMT. 
The failure of this inference was a key prediction in Experiments 1 and 2. If this is the case, then ¬(A or B 
or both) must be consistent with A or B but not both, with the immediate consequence that ¬A & ¬B must 
be consistent with A or B but not both, which is absurd.  
A or B, therefore, ◊A. This inference was investigated in Hinterecker et al.’s Experiment 3, and it 
is regarded as “valid” in revised MMT. Like the exclusive-or to inclusive-or inference in the last section, 
the claim that this is a valid inference leads to some absurdities. So, if valid, A or B is inconsistent with 
¬◊A, but A or B, ¬◊A, therefore B is a common inference pattern for epistemic possibility, and not 
because the premises are inconsistent. For example, suppose we hear from a reliable source that Mary has 
an essay to write, and is in the library or working on her computer (or both). Then we learn from the 
library website that it is not possible that Mary is in the library: it is closed today. This example provides 
a clear epistemic use of possibility as defined by Khemlani et al. (2017): it is based on our “personal 
knowledge” of the website. But we can now clearly conclude that Mary is working on her computer. 
Moreover, given that A or B is inconsistent with ¬◊A for this epistemic use, the following derivation must 
be “valid” in revised MMT: ¬◊A, therefore ¬(A or B), therefore, ¬A & ¬B, therefore, ¬B. Hence from the 
fact that Mary, by our personal knowledge, cannot possibly be in the library, we can infer ¬B for any 
arbitrary B in revised MMT, for example, 1 + 1 ≠ 2.  
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Subadditivity. In Hinterecker’s et al.’s experiments participants were also asked to judge the 
probability of all four cases in the joint probability distribution (JPD) for two propositions A and B, when 
described as possibilities (Experiment 1) and when not so described (Experiment 2). They found that 
people’s judgements were highly subadditive, that is, they summed to considerably more than 1. While 
this result has no immediate bearing on the inferences people should or did draw in these experiments, 
Hinterecker et al. (2016) argue that this result uniquely supports the revised MMT theory. However, the 
theory of how people judge the subjective probabilities of the singular events used in their materials 
(Khemlani, Lotstein, & Johnson-Laird, 2012, 2015) forms no part of the revised MMT. It is an ad hoc and 
detachable theory to which other psychological theories could just as well appeal.3 
The finding of subadditivity for judging the possibility of the four JPD cases is also not 
independent of the lack of a normative account of the probability of possibilities. As we argued in the 
section, Probabilities of Possibilities, the standard account is that if X is possible, then the only constraint 
on Pr(X) is that it is greater than 0 and could be 1. So it is unclear how this finding argues against the 
probabilistic approach. Hinterecker et al. claim further that the finding of subadditivity when the JPD 
cases were not described as possible (Experiment 2) counts against the probabilistic view. But all of the 
materials used in Hinterecker et al. were future contingent statements (Øhrstrøm & Hasle, 2015) about 
possible future events, for example, “A nuclear weapon will be used in a terrorist attack in the next 
decade”. It is arguable that people can have some evidence to judge such a statement likely, and some 
other evidence to judge its negation likely, and so their overall subadditive probability judgments, while 
incoherent, would be explicable in a probabilistic account.   
 
 
                                                 
 
3 However, we would argue that recent research in the Bayesian paradigm on using restricted Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling with typical vs. atypical exemplars provides a more compelling account of 
the cognitive algorithms underlying subadditivity and superadditivity effects in probability judgement (Dasgupta, 
Schulz, & Gershman, 2017). 
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Levels of Explanation 
The standard account of computational explanation in the cognitive sciences is multi-levelled 
(e.g., Anderson, 1990; Marr, 1982). The computational (Marr, 1982) or rational (Anderson, 1990) level 
specifies a normatively justified and descriptively adequate model for some cognitive phenomenon. The 
computational level is implemented at the algorithmic or performance level. At this level, the choices of 
representations and processes to implement the computational level theory may introduce deviations from 
the prescriptions of the computational level theory. These deviations can be because of the complexity 
profile of the algorithm, or because of the nature of the representations themselves. System P and standard 
binary logic are both computational level theories of the inferences that people should draw. The previous 
version of MMT fitted clearly into this explanatory scheme. The computational level theory of MMT was 
binary logic. When mental models were complete and fully explicit, they captured the DNF of the 
premises, and hence licensed all and only the inferences licensed by binary logic. However, mental 
models only partially represent the DNF, and this can lead to systematic deviations from binary logic. 
MMT was an algorithmic theory.  
 
Problems with Levels 
Several consequences follow from considering how the theories compared in Hinterecker et al. 
(2016) fit into this scheme for computational explanation in the cognitive sciences. 
Comparing different levels. Hinterecker et al. (2016) compare a computational level theory, 
what they called “p-logic,” with an algorithmic level theory, revised MMT. This comparison is 
inappropriate as no one holds that “p-logic” systems are, unmodified, adequate descriptive, algorithmic 
theories. Evans, Thompson, and Over (2015) and Cruz et al. (2015) set out to discover the conditions 
under which people may better conform to the requirements of coherence and p-validity. These studies 
presupposed that people do not always conform to the prescriptions of these normative, computational 
level theories, and indeed they contained two results on incoherence that revised MMT has not so far 
explained. Evans et al. found subaddivity caused by negation in their materials. And Cruz et al. showed 
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that not even explicit inference helped people to avoid the conjunction fallacy: people violated p-validity 
and became incoherent even when explicitly inferring A from A & B in the context of the Linda problem 
known to produce the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Hinterecker et al. (2016) 
mention both Evans et al. and Cruz et al., but do not acknowledge that these researchers did not expect 
people to conform exactly to “p-logic”. In fact, Evans et al. and Cruz et al. provide more convincing 
evidence for this conclusion than Hinterecker et al. on inferring ◊(A & B) from A or B, because 
Hinterecker et al. fail to specify what Pr(◊(A & B)) should normatively be in “p-logic”. 
No computational level theory of revised MMT. The lack of a normative, computational level 
theory of Pr(◊(A & B)) could be argued to count against the probabilistic approach as well as limit the 
conclusions Hinterecker et al. can draw (see, the summary of the section on Probabilistic Validity). 
However, revised MMT is in the same position; it lacks a normative, computational level theory of the 
modal inferences licensed by interpreting mental models as COPs. We have already pointed out that many 
inferential absurdities arise from adopting this interpretation.  
It is possible that these absurdities do not arise. But to establish that this is the case, Hinterecker 
et al. require a specification of the sound, complete, and decidable normative system which revised MMT 
implements. Previously, fully fleshed out mental models, interpreted as DNFs, respected classical binary 
logic. For revised MMT, we need to know what normative theory fully fleshed out mental models respect 
when interpreted as COPs? It cannot be classical binary logic as the COPs interpretation rules out at least 
three inferences which this normative theory licenses as valid. 
Adding valid inferences. A striking feature of revised MMT is that inferences that are invalid in 
standard normative modal logics are classified as “valid”. This classification is in contrast with System P, 
in which the adoption of the probability conditional implies that some classical inferences for the 
conditional are invalid. If to derive a plausible psychological theory of reasoning, we restrict the number 
of valid inferences in a provably consistent normative system, we do not have to worry about the 
consistency of these restricted procedures. If a system is provably consistent, a sub-system of it must be 
too. However, when we add supposedly “valid” inferences to try to obtain a plausible theory, the question 
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of consistency does arise. Do the new “valid” inferences lead to a contradiction in the extended system? 
The absurdities we have easily derived from the revised MMT imply that this is a pressing question for 
MMT.  
Validity and “validity.” The problem we have just identified might be defused if Hinterecker et 
al. argued that they do not mean to assert that these extra modal inferences are normatively valid. But 
Khemlani, et al. (2017) are perfectly clear that the revised MMT has a normative position on the 
“validity” of the inference from A or B or both to ◊(A & B), which they label (7), and the “invalidity” of 
the inference from A or B but not both to A or B or both, which they label (8). They point out that (7) is 
invalid, (8) is valid, in well-known modal logics, but they add, “On our account, reasoners are justified in 
feeling that the invalidity of (7) and the validity of (8) are counterintuitive and incorrect.” Hinterecker et 
al. and Khemlani et al. ascribe biases and errors to people (e.g., Hinterecker et al. make a number of 
references to belief bias), and they claim that the system of fully explicit models can "correct the errors 
and biases" (Khemlani et al., 2017) of the fast system of mental models. But they do not justify the 
system of fully explicit models itself as a normative system, which should have, at the very least, a 
consistency proof, like the systems of modal logic that they discuss. Khemlani et al. refer specifically to 
modal system T (they also mention system K, but K is too weak to express epistemic modality). There are 
consistency, soundness, completeness, and decidability results for system T (Chellas, 1980).  
In the absence of a consistency proof for revised MMT, there is no explanation of why it has 
evolved in human beings, or been otherwise acquired, as a reasoning system (Anderson, 1990). It is 
supposed to be a system for reasoning with not, and, or, if, and possibly, and at a minimum such an 
elementary system should be able to detect and eliminate inconsistencies in reasoning with these terms, at 
least under certain conditions (when the models are fully explicit). This is impossible if the proposed 
system is itself inconsistent.  
Illusions and the computational level. Hinterecker et al. (2016) cannot retreat into descriptivism 
(Elqayam & Evans, 2010), claiming that they are giving a scientific account of what might be people’s 
inconsistent reasoning system. First, their scientific account would have to be consistent, and second, this 
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would be to abandon the MMT account of cognitive illusions of reasoning (Cohen, 1981). These illusions 
are inferences people accept (reject), although logic says that they are invalid (valid) because their partial 
mental models suggest they are valid (invalid) (Johnson-Laird, 2001; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2017). 
As Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2017, p. 11) argue, these partial mental models “…usually represent 
what is true in a possibility, not what is false. This procedure reduces the load on working memory, and 
for the most part, it yields valid inferences.” We need to know with respect to what provably consistent 
system revised MMT “for the most part…yields valid [modal] inferences.” 
What then is the status of the novel modal inferences Hinterecker et al. investigate? We do not 
know of a normative theory with respect to which they are valid. On the one hand, they could be 
cognitive illusions. On the other hand, Hinterecker et al. seem to want to regard them as valid inferences, 
which, as we have seen, leads to many logical absurdities. Another possibility is that the intuitions that 
their experiments have apparently uncovered are just that, inferential intuitions that require some 
explanation but which in the absence of a normative theory we cannot identify as valid inferences or 
cognitive illusions.  
Summary. Hinterecker et al. (2016) inappropriately compare “p-logic” with the revised MMT, 
which are defined at different levels of computational explanation. Proponents of the probabilistic 
approach have never represented it as a descriptive algorithmic level theory (see, for example, Oaksford 
& Chater, 2003). Moreover, they have provided better evidence than Hinterecker at al. (2016) that, 
although a better descriptive theory than classical binary logic, p-validity is not fully descriptive of 
human reasoning. Hinterecker et al. (2016) do not provide a computational level theory for revised 
MMT, which is problematic given they appear to want to add normatively valid modal inferences. That 
is, MMTs interpreted as COPs apparently yield valid modal conclusions that Hinterecker et al. want to 
argue are not cognitive illusions. In the absence of a provably consistent computational level theory, it is 
impossible to make good on this claim. As things stand, as we have demonstrated in previous sections, 
the claim that these modal inferences are valid leads to many logical absurdities.  
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The Experimental Data 
Hinterecker et al. present three experiments. In their Experiments 1 and 2, they investigated 
inferences from inclusive and exclusive disjunctions to modal conclusions: (1) A or B or both, therefore 
◊(A & B), (2) A or B or not both, therefore ◊(A & B), inferences from exclusive to inclusive disjunctions: 
(3) A or B or not both, therefore, A or B or both, and inclusive to exclusive disjunctions: (4) A or B or 
both, therefore, A or B or not both (we use the same numbering as, Hinterecker et al. 2016: Table 1). 
Experiment 3 looked at four inferences for each of three different premises: A or B or both, therefore, ◊A, 
◊B, ◊(A & B) , or ◊(¬A & ¬B) (5 - 8), A & B, therefore, A, B, A or B or both, or ¬A & ¬B (9 - 12), not 
both A & B, therefore, ◊A, ◊B, ◊(¬A & ¬B), or A & B (13 - 16). 
 
The Materials.  
We make a couple of observations about the materials used which leads to a conjecture about the 
results. First, for the non-modal inferences (9 -12), p-validity captured the data well. Moreover, 
participants judging that Pr(conclusion) ≥ Pr(premise) was a good predictor of acceptance and rejection 
rates. Second, endorsement of the remaining modal inferences seems to be far more related to the surface 
form of the non-colloquial expressions used for inclusive (A or B or both) and exclusive-or (A or B or not 
both), rather than to deep semantic, COP representations. We checked the occurrence of the expressions 
“or both” and “or not both” against the British National Corpus (2015) of 100M words of text and spoken 
language. We also checked “but not both” which is perhaps a more colloquial expression. Out of the 
355,615 occurrences of “or” it was accompanied by “both” on 0.23% (819), by “not both” on 0.0006% 
(2), and by “but not both” on 0.007% (26) of occasions.4 Overwhelmingly, natural language does not 
mark inclusive and exclusive or in these ways. Context is left to disambiguate between the two 
                                                 
 
4 Most of these occurrences were in technical or legal documents. 
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interpretations. To properly test whether people spontaneously draw these inferences in the real world 
would involve just using “or” and allowing context to disambiguate.  
 
Surface Form.  
The inclusion of these locutions means that the modal conclusions that participants were asked to 
accept or reject are described explicitly in the surface form of the premises for A or B or both (◊A or ◊B or 
◊(A & B)). This diagnosis applies equally to not both A & B, as it only excludes A & B. Consequently, 
participants endorse any other conclusion with which they are presented as possible. We also conjecture 
that people may also accept the same conclusions in the absence of the modal operator. There is evidence 
that although people endorse the valid inference A & B, therefore, A or B more than the invalid inference 
A or B, therefore, A & B, they still endorse the latter at greater than 50% (Cruz, Over, Oaksford, & 
Baratgin, 2016). Consequently, it would be useful to repeat these experiments without the modal 
operators in the conclusions.  Of course, if people endorse the non-modal conclusions, then they should 
also endorse the modal conclusion. This inference is natural because, for example, it is raining (X) is a 
stronger claim than it is possible that it is raining (◊X), and so it is possible that it is raining could be 
thought of as more probable than it is raining, Pr(◊X) ≥ Pr(X), and then it is raining, therefore, it is 
possible that it is raining (X, therefore, ◊X) would be p-valid. 
 
A Final Proposal. 
The last conjecture above does not lead to a full theory of epistemic modal inferences. But we 
should recall that other than redefining mental models as COPs, revised MMT does not provide such a 
theory either. We, therefore, present a final proposal based on logic programming and natural language 
semantics that may provide the beginnings of a theory. 
 
 
       
PARADIGMS, POSSIBILITIES, AND PROBABILITIES 22 
Negation as Failure.  
Logic programming uses the negation-as-failure procedure (Clark, 1978; Stenning & van 
Lambalgen, 2005): if A cannot be derived (⊢) from the content of the database consisting of an agent’s 
world knowledge (Γ), then ¬A can be inferred (Γ ⊬ A, therefore, ¬A). If we substitute ¬A for A, then we 
arrive at the classical epistemic fallacy of the argument from ignorance, Γ ⊬ ¬A, therefore, A. For 
example, Ghosts exist because we can not prove that they do not (Chater, Oaksford, Hahn, & Heit, 2011; 
Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004). The argument from ignorance is an epistemic fallacy 
because not being able to prove that Ghosts do not exist from what you know does not mean that they do 
exist. An epistemically more prudent conclusion to draw from not being able to prove that Ghosts do not 
exist is that possibly Ghosts exist (Γ ⊬ ¬A, therefore, ◊A), that is, you cannot rule it out. If all we know is 
what we are told in the premises, for example, Γ = A or B, then A or B ⊬ ¬(A & B), A or B ⊬ ¬ A, and A 
or B ⊬ ¬B. Hence the epistemically prudent conclusions are ◊(A & B), ◊A, and ◊B respectively. As we 
now show, these epistemically prudent conclusions may arise, not from the meaning of a disjunction, but 
from pragmatic considerations. 
 
Evidentiality and Indirectness Signalling. 
 Epistemic modals are frequently used in English to mark a source of evidence as indirect and 
inferred (Aikhenvald, 2004; von Fintel & Gillies, 2010).5 We suspect that this may be the function they 
are performing in Hinterecker et al.’s (2016) materials, which is consistent with the analysis we have just 
provided. For example, on seeing people entering the building shaking their umbrellas, you have indirect 
evidence to infer “It must be raining”, in one ordinary use of “must”, but not direct evidence for asserting 
“It is raining.” This use of the modal “must” indicates this claim is inferred from the evidence. This 
                                                 
 
5 There is empirical work emerging on evidentiality in the psychology of reasoning, for example, 
Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, & Douven (2013) and Karaslaan, Hohenberger, Demir, Hall, & Oaksford (in press). 
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function captures our example about studying in the library. If the library is closed, one can infer that “it 
is not possible that Mary is there,” therefore, she must be at home. However, what if you know nothing 
that would allow you to infer she is not in the library? You would have to concede that she might be in 
the library, that is, it is possible. This natural language evidential function of modals suggests that “Mary 
is at home” can be a stronger claim than “Mary must be at home” in some uses, whereas in standard 
modal logic, it is always the other way round. This puzzle has been called “Karttunen’s Problem” after 
the philosopher who first pointed it out (Karttunen, 1972). There are possible semantic solutions to it (von 
Fintel & Gillies, 2010), but it has been conceded that there remains uncertainty about whether “…the 
indirectness signal [derives] from conversational principles [it is pragmatic] rather than hardwiring it into 
the semantics of epistemic modals” (von Fintel & Gillies, 2010, p. 381). That is, this could well be a 
pragmatic phenomenon. Knowing the disjunction can give people pragmatic grounds for asserting ◊(A & 
B), because they cannot rule out A & B. They therefore pragmatically make the inference without further 
information, for example that A is impossible (the library is closed). In this analysis, ◊(A & B) is not a 
deductively valid consequence of the disjunction.6  
In summary, there is a more principled and generalizable way of drawing the epistemic modal 
conclusions Hinterecker et al. (2016) observed other than by introducing COPs in the revised MMT. A 
participant need only check the DNF to see whether the negation of the conclusion follows. If not, then 
there is indirect inferred evidence for the claim because it cannot be ruled out, which would commonly be 
marked by the modal “possibly” in natural language. This option potentially leaves MMT just where it 
was, with classical binary logic as its computational level theory, but it has a downside.  The paradoxes of 
material implication would remain valid in MMT, despite evidence that people do not endorse them (Cruz 
et al. 2017).  
                                                 
 
6 At the very least, Karttunen’s problem shows that modals, like “must” are ambiguous between the 
necessity and the evidential reading. It is possible that an appropriate semantics for the evidential reading can be 
developed, perhaps tied to the interpretation of conditionals (Krzyżanowska et al., 2013). However, as von Fintel 
and Gillies (2010) observe, it is also possible that this is a pragmatic phenomenon.  
PARADIGMS, POSSIBILITIES, AND PROBABILITIES 24 
Conclusion 
In this comment, we have argued that Hinterecker et al. (2016) have not adequately characterised 
the theory of probabilistic validity (p-validity).  They do not show how to apply p-validity to their modal 
inferences, which are anyway peripheral to the theory. We also pointed out that revised MMT is not well 
motivated and its adoption leads to many logical absurdities.  We further argued that the comparison 
between p-validity and revised MMT is not appropriate because these theories are defined at different 
levels of computational explanation. In particular, revised MMT lacks an appropriate computational level 
theory, with a consistency proof, that could justify treating these inferences as valid. Furthermore, 
Hinterecker et al.’s data could result from the non-colloquial locutions used to express the premises. 
Finally, we sketched an alternative account based on logic programming and the evidential signalling 
function of epistemic modals, which suggests that the modal conclusions Hinterecker et al. observed are 
the result of these conclusions being indirectly inferred. That is, it is a pragmatic phenomenon. This 
account could be applied to the unrevised mental model theory, interpreted as DNFs, rendering the 
revision, using COPs, redundant.  
The original appeal of MMT was that, under certain conditions (fully explicit models), this 
performance theory fully implemented its computational level theory of binary logic. Thus people were, 
in principle, capable of rational thought but often erred because they represented premises only partially. 
In revised MMT, interpreted as COPs, this connection is broken. No provably consistent system has been 
presented that revised MMT implements when fully explicit. This omission makes it impossible to 
interpret Hinterecker et al.’s claim (along with those of Khemlani et al.) to have identified novel and 
normatively valid modal inferences. We suspect that these inferences are pragmatic, resulting from the 
indirectness signalling function of epistemic modals. MMT does need to respond to the challenge of the 
new probabilistic paradigm, but the current revision of MMT does not appear to be the most promising 
avenue to go down. 
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